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Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012-2017

navy-informatino-dominance-human-capital-strategyIDC Human Capital Mission – Build and sustain an agile Total Force that acquires, exploits, and employs ID capabilities to achieve Navy mission requirements.

IDC Human Capital Vision – Attract, develop, and retain a cohort of highly trained and competent officers, enlisted, and civilian professionals who are fully integrated with the Navy’s combat forces, and delivering warfighting effects (including Cyber Warfare) to Naval and Joint forces across the full spectrum of military operations.

Developing and sustaining a viable and responsive Information Dominance Corps (IDC) requires a commitment to workforce planning and management processes, delivery of a Corps-wide learning continuum, and cultivation of an identifiable, inclusive Information Dominance culture and ethos. This Human Capital Strategy constitutes the first installment on that commitment and provides a structured, balanced and deliberate approach for ensuring the Navy’s IDC is qualified, ready and sustainable. It is framed on four strategic goals, each supported by a set of measurable objectives, which drive their implementation:

  • Manage the Corps as a Total Force
    1. Develop a strategy for the effective utilization of all components of the Total Force, including a specific plan of action for the civilians across the IDC.
    2. Identify which ID human capital advantages are complementary to the overarching operational mission.
    3. Create and strengthen partnerships with centers of innovation and thought leadership within the Federal, Defense, and private sectors.
  • Build Competencies through Training, Education, and Experience
    1. Validate IDC core competency framework and refresh the Community-specific competency models.
    2. Conduct competency-based training needs assessments.
    3. Conduct analyses to prioritize, resource, and sequence training development, modification, and repurposing efforts.
    4. Develop cross-functional ID career paths.
  • Strategically Integrate and Align the IDC Workforce with Mission and Capability Requirements
    1. Define the mission requirement (duties and tasks).
    2. Translate mission requirements into capability requirements.
    3. Develop a resourcing strategy for the fulfillment of capability requirements (manpower).
    1. Orient the total Navy workforce to the IDC mission and vision through a multi-mode, leadershipdelivered strategic communication initiative.
    2. Leverage kill chain concepts (integrated fires) to depict and communicate the process through which ID discipline contributes to the delivery of warfighting effects.

The Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy reflects the essential value we place on people at the leading-edge of the Navy’s Information Dominance capability. It likewise reinforces the IDC’s commitment to creating an environment that capitalizes on talent, further develops expertise, advances professional careers, and promotes the fullest contribution to the ID mission. The Human Capital Strategy provides direction to the workforce and to the supporting Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education domain that ultimately drives the IDC as a profession. This strategy sets the IDC on a path towards success as information becomes a principal warfighting pillar in the Navy’s arsenal. The IDC’s success depends on agility, flexibility, and adaptability to deliver the right people with the right skills, at the right time and place, and at the best value. We are committed to leveraging the best

This IDC Human Capital Strategy supports the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance, additional related supporting documents include: the Navy Information Dominance Roadmap, 2013-2028; Navy Cyber Power 2020; the Naval Intelligence Strategy, 2013-2020; and, the 2013 Navy Space Strategy. Within this integrated framework, the Navy begins in earnest the process of marshaling its resources, galvanizing the workforce, and aligning Navy’s Information Dominance capabilities to fully enable the Navy’s primary tenet of Warfighting First.

[via TENTH FLEET]

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I was a 3rd Class Midshipman at Maine Maritime Academy when Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka put together this Proceedings article.  I had walked on to an NROTC program, buckled down on my academics and earned a scholarship.    I remember reading it and thinking that it was a bit of a “flashback” vice forward looking.  But that was mostly because I had grown up with these items.  I’d had the Atari, the Commodore 64, and even a suitcase 286 loaned to me to “play” with.  But having experienced much of what is talked about in the paper I encourage another review of the document.  I’ve put together a few of the items that I find most important to where the Navy has come with the Information Dominance Corps, where it has fallen short, and where it can work to overtake it’s missteps.

Admiral Jay Johnson said it is “a fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare.” This was operationally shifted effectively, however the man, train, and equip entity remained focused on providing platform-centric leaders (Aviation, Surface, Submarines).  I would argue that since the start of this decade, warfare we exercise has always been technology-centric but from the days of recognizing network as an enabler for Naval missions it has shifted from the network-centric that Cebrowski described to  information-centricty and this centricity is only becoming more prominent and identifiable.

Vice Admiral (ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski

Cebrowski’s three main themes still hold true with information-centricity:

  • The shift in focus from the platform to the network
  • The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a continuously adapting ecosystem
  • The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such changing ecosystems
We’ve started to network everything (not well in some cases) but the information has become dominant.  The legacy platforms we still man-train-equip are becoming simple sensory platforms for the information-centricity in the global battlespace.
Intellectual Capital – Information-based processes are the dominant value-adding processes in both the commercial world and the military. Yet the military fails to reward competence in these areas. “Operator” status frequently is denied to personnel with these critical talents, but the value of traditional operators with limited acumen in these processes is falling, and ultimately they will be marginalized, especially at mid-grade and senior levels. The war fighter who does not understand the true source of his combat power in such things as CEC, Global Command and Control System, and Link-16 simply is worth less than those who do. The services must both mainstream and merge those with technical skills and those with operational experience in these areas. These are the new operators.”
I don’t think I could come up with a better summation for why there is a push for:
  • the Information Dominance Corps to become a URL (right or wrong for the long term good of the Navy);
  • better implementation of these systems to ensure the Human Computer Interaction (and understanding by the human) is so important;
  • the development of a significant core of technologists within the U.S. Navy;
  • the increase of this core in personnel number and improvement in ability.

Financial Capital – although the Navy made an effective transition into the network-centric era it has now allowed those networks to wane.  The sensors available to the U.S. Military are unable to reach the forces afloat as it would flood and exceed the capabilities of the supporting infrastructure.  While the corporate Navy looks for IT inefficiencies reduce costs the afloat forces require significant resources to bring them into the current generation of technology (again Big Navy and the U.S. Navy have always been technology-centric) in order to move the supporting information-centric element.

Transformation Process- The ponderous acquisition process remains; technology speed of advance has only increased.  I’ve heard more than 50 FO/GO and their equivalent civilian counterparts state this problem over the last 7 years and yet it continues to remain.  We own these rules – the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense.  Call it a Grand Challenge – we’ve seen the model that has worked for USSOCOM; make it the model for everything and move on.  We’ll find the issues with this new model and another, better model one will develop.

I want to ensure I’m not opposing an adversary in the future while worrying about a National Deficit in the $15 trillion realm.  I want this reduced, eliminated and operate at a surplus.

Let’s become the lender; Let’s return to be the global leader!

[via Proceedings]

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First the obvious disclosure piece.  I’m never comfortable with allowing & receiving reports from those you procure services from.  I’m even less comfortable with Northrop Grumman’s Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage report.  I don’t understand what would possess the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to accept such a report let alone request and fund it from a Department of Defense contractor with significant interests in this developing area.  I could care less if these information security analysts were the best on the planet this in my mind is a clear conflict of interest and “personnel firewalls” have zero effectiveness.

With all that mentioned let’s see what they put together in this massive document.

The immediate focus of the document is  on “information confrontation.”  They point to a Chinese paper on Infomization Dominance.  Sounds a lot like the U.S. Navy’s Information Dominance Corps focus doesn’t it?  Additionally it discusses China’s Integrated Network Electronic Warfare or INEW strategy.

PLA analysts consistently identify logistics and C4ISR infrastructure as U.S. strategic centers of gravity suggesting that PLA commanders will almost certainly attempt to target these system with both electronic countermeasures weapons and network attack and exploitation tools, likely in advance of actual combat to delay U.S. entry or degrade capabilities in a conflict.

This is of significant concern.  The United States has continued to outsource and outsupply items through every portion of our lives and the result is this has forced the US Military to be dependent upon similar sourcing paths and venues.  Until a shift toward in house production and upfront investments to mitigate supply chain risk this will continue to leave a massive vulnerability through every level of the Department of Defense and Critical Infrastructure of the United States.

At least 50 civilian universities conducting information security research nationwide benefit from one or more of roughly five main national-level high technology grant programs, reflecting what appears to be a broad technology development plan consistent with published national priorities.

My immediate response was that the U.S. has so many more universities conducting information security research that it dwarfs the metric listed.  While true what is more concerning is the number of individuals China has attending our universities which compliments this metric.  The cost is often prohibitive for the US Government and Military to send or acquire personnel from places like Carnegie Mellon University.  However, for a highly resourced entity the ability to integrate with the leading Computer Science and Information Security university and research entities is much more significant.

Without strict control of this complex upstream channel, a manufacturer of routers, switches, or other basic telecommunications hardware is exposed to innumerable points of possible tampering and must rely on rigorous and often expensive testing to ensure that the 11 semiconductors being delivered are trustworthy and will perform only as specified, with no additional unauthorized capabilities hidden from view.

Until the U.S. changes its Research and Development to include Production capabilities this will pose a massive risk which cannot be managed, improved, or worked around.  I’ve seen discussions to make this a responsibility of the GSA or other major government entity but I’m not sure GSA could effectively get this accomplished.  I believe an entity tasked with this would need to be supported heavily by the National Laboratories and Research & Development components of the USG.

Professional state sponsored intelligence collection not only targets a nation’s sensitive national security and policy making information, it increasingly is being used to collect economic and competitive data to aid foreign businesses competing for market share with their U.S. peers.

There is no longer a difference between national security information and economic and competitive data information.  Intellectual Property is part of a Cyber War and this includes the piracy of information and data.  The difficult part of this is discerning the difference between Cyber Warfare and  Cyber Crime.  Where does this get handed to Cyber Command or the Department of Homeland Security?  This is something that is currently being debated in the U.S. Congress.  There are a couple of Information Security Bills being tossed around;  Senator McCain’s Bill and Senator Lieberman’s Bill.

Media and industry reports portray some of the incidents attributed to China as advanced but the reality is that many successful penetrations are “advanced” only because the targeted organization was unable to stop them or detect the presence of the operators on their networks.

This is simply the complex media spin that exists in the United States.  It makes it more interesting and sexy if it was complex.  The story isn’t as valuable (yes advertisements run everything) to the news venue with out this interesting and sexy spin on it.  Not bad to note that this is the case but if you don’t understand that this is occurring you aren’t paying enough attention.

Activities attributed to state sponsored operators often appear to target data that is not easily monetized in underground criminal online auctions or markets but highly valuable to foreign governments. Highly technical defense engineering information, operational military data, or government policy analysis documents rarely if ever appear to be a priority for cybercriminal groups.

This is well executed obfuscation of the intent of the adversary.  If it is difficult to determine why certain information was ex-filtrated then it provides less alarm to the victim.  This allows further ex-filtration from other entities to compliment the data and turn it into very valuable and actionable information.

To date, the former joint venture between Huawei Shenzhen Technology Company Ltd and Symantec, Inc. is the only major partnering between a Western information security firm and a Chinese high technology company.

This has since been disolved as of 26 March 2012.  The New York Times did a quick piece called Symantec Dissolves a Chinese Alliance.  So we’re starting to see significant implications of a quiet and cold Cyber War that is well underway both in the private and public sectors.

The PLA is to prepare for “Local wars under informationized conditions.”

PLA leaders included additional responsibilities under the third role that identified not only space and distant ocean areas as domains vital to Chinese national security interests, but also included the electromagnetic spectrum—a change that is likely already driving PLA investment in the development of more sophisticated information warfare capabilities. 

And

The PLA Daily described warfare under informationized conditions as being characterized by opposing sides using complete systems of ground, naval, air, space, and electromagnetic forces.

This essentially reflects the exact move the U.S. Navy made in 2009 when Admiral Roughead formed the U.S. Navy’s Information Dominance Corps.  It effectively recognized the Electromagnetic Spectrum as the 5th domain.  This has also been echoed via General Michael Hayden (USAF, Ret), former Director of NSA and CIA.  So who started this operationalization of Cyberspace?

Information Confrontation Theory: The strategic imperative for the PLA to operate in the electromagnetic domain is driving the formulation of a new approach to information warfare, termed information confrontation (xinxi duikang; 信息对抗), that applies system of systems operations theory to information warfare, viewing it as a macro-system comprised of discrete capabilities linked together under a single command structure and fully integrated into the overall campaign plan.

Information confrontation theories currently being developed and refined within the PLA today seek to address these gaps, particularly the need for more coherent command infrastructure.

With this section I see absolutely no difference compared to the initiatives the USG and its Military is pursuing.  Remind you of anything?  Maybe the Cold War?  The “adversary has developed this so I must” paradigm.  Locks everyone in a continuous do-loop until someone finally gives up.

PLA had created a “super-elite unit of cyberwarriors” designed to carry out network exploitation of foreign networks.

There have been continued reports on this network exploitation team formed in China and in other countries which now includes the United States Military.  Unlike the United States China has denied existence of this type of unit even though numerous evidence, videos, and other indicators continue to validate it’s existence.   But at this point this fact doesn’t matter.  Most are operating under the assumption that it does exist and that most countries with the ability will form a similar cadre with cyber expertise.

Much of the remainder of the document stipulates and speculates on what-ifs and could happen items.  This can be chalked up to “cyber marketing.”  This brings me back to the disclosure  piece.  The document isn’t that bad but since Northrop Grumman produced it you must rightfully discount it.  This then devalues the tax dollars that were spent on it.  I have nothing against Northrop Grumman.  I simply believe this could have been produced in a much better fashion from one of the dedicated Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC), like SEI or MITRE vice a services and production based contractor such as Northrop Grumman.

[via USCC]

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