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Navy Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012-2017

navy-informatino-dominance-human-capital-strategyIDC Human Capital Mission – Build and sustain an agile Total Force that acquires, exploits, and employs ID capabilities to achieve Navy mission requirements.

IDC Human Capital Vision – Attract, develop, and retain a cohort of highly trained and competent officers, enlisted, and civilian professionals who are fully integrated with the Navy’s combat forces, and delivering warfighting effects (including Cyber Warfare) to Naval and Joint forces across the full spectrum of military operations.

Developing and sustaining a viable and responsive Information Dominance Corps (IDC) requires a commitment to workforce planning and management processes, delivery of a Corps-wide learning continuum, and cultivation of an identifiable, inclusive Information Dominance culture and ethos. This Human Capital Strategy constitutes the first installment on that commitment and provides a structured, balanced and deliberate approach for ensuring the Navy’s IDC is qualified, ready and sustainable. It is framed on four strategic goals, each supported by a set of measurable objectives, which drive their implementation:

  • Manage the Corps as a Total Force
    1. Develop a strategy for the effective utilization of all components of the Total Force, including a specific plan of action for the civilians across the IDC.
    2. Identify which ID human capital advantages are complementary to the overarching operational mission.
    3. Create and strengthen partnerships with centers of innovation and thought leadership within the Federal, Defense, and private sectors.
  • Build Competencies through Training, Education, and Experience
    1. Validate IDC core competency framework and refresh the Community-specific competency models.
    2. Conduct competency-based training needs assessments.
    3. Conduct analyses to prioritize, resource, and sequence training development, modification, and repurposing efforts.
    4. Develop cross-functional ID career paths.
  • Strategically Integrate and Align the IDC Workforce with Mission and Capability Requirements
    1. Define the mission requirement (duties and tasks).
    2. Translate mission requirements into capability requirements.
    3. Develop a resourcing strategy for the fulfillment of capability requirements (manpower).
    1. Orient the total Navy workforce to the IDC mission and vision through a multi-mode, leadershipdelivered strategic communication initiative.
    2. Leverage kill chain concepts (integrated fires) to depict and communicate the process through which ID discipline contributes to the delivery of warfighting effects.

The Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy reflects the essential value we place on people at the leading-edge of the Navy’s Information Dominance capability. It likewise reinforces the IDC’s commitment to creating an environment that capitalizes on talent, further develops expertise, advances professional careers, and promotes the fullest contribution to the ID mission. The Human Capital Strategy provides direction to the workforce and to the supporting Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education domain that ultimately drives the IDC as a profession. This strategy sets the IDC on a path towards success as information becomes a principal warfighting pillar in the Navy’s arsenal. The IDC’s success depends on agility, flexibility, and adaptability to deliver the right people with the right skills, at the right time and place, and at the best value. We are committed to leveraging the best

This IDC Human Capital Strategy supports the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information Dominance, additional related supporting documents include: the Navy Information Dominance Roadmap, 2013-2028; Navy Cyber Power 2020; the Naval Intelligence Strategy, 2013-2020; and, the 2013 Navy Space Strategy. Within this integrated framework, the Navy begins in earnest the process of marshaling its resources, galvanizing the workforce, and aligning Navy’s Information Dominance capabilities to fully enable the Navy’s primary tenet of Warfighting First.

[via TENTH FLEET]

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I was a 3rd Class Midshipman at Maine Maritime Academy when Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka put together this Proceedings article.  I had walked on to an NROTC program, buckled down on my academics and earned a scholarship.    I remember reading it and thinking that it was a bit of a “flashback” vice forward looking.  But that was mostly because I had grown up with these items.  I’d had the Atari, the Commodore 64, and even a suitcase 286 loaned to me to “play” with.  But having experienced much of what is talked about in the paper I encourage another review of the document.  I’ve put together a few of the items that I find most important to where the Navy has come with the Information Dominance Corps, where it has fallen short, and where it can work to overtake it’s missteps.

Admiral Jay Johnson said it is “a fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare.” This was operationally shifted effectively, however the man, train, and equip entity remained focused on providing platform-centric leaders (Aviation, Surface, Submarines).  I would argue that since the start of this decade, warfare we exercise has always been technology-centric but from the days of recognizing network as an enabler for Naval missions it has shifted from the network-centric that Cebrowski described to  information-centricty and this centricity is only becoming more prominent and identifiable.

Vice Admiral (ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski

Cebrowski’s three main themes still hold true with information-centricity:

  • The shift in focus from the platform to the network
  • The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a continuously adapting ecosystem
  • The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in such changing ecosystems
We’ve started to network everything (not well in some cases) but the information has become dominant.  The legacy platforms we still man-train-equip are becoming simple sensory platforms for the information-centricity in the global battlespace.
Intellectual Capital – Information-based processes are the dominant value-adding processes in both the commercial world and the military. Yet the military fails to reward competence in these areas. “Operator” status frequently is denied to personnel with these critical talents, but the value of traditional operators with limited acumen in these processes is falling, and ultimately they will be marginalized, especially at mid-grade and senior levels. The war fighter who does not understand the true source of his combat power in such things as CEC, Global Command and Control System, and Link-16 simply is worth less than those who do. The services must both mainstream and merge those with technical skills and those with operational experience in these areas. These are the new operators.”
I don’t think I could come up with a better summation for why there is a push for:
  • the Information Dominance Corps to become a URL (right or wrong for the long term good of the Navy);
  • better implementation of these systems to ensure the Human Computer Interaction (and understanding by the human) is so important;
  • the development of a significant core of technologists within the U.S. Navy;
  • the increase of this core in personnel number and improvement in ability.

Financial Capital – although the Navy made an effective transition into the network-centric era it has now allowed those networks to wane.  The sensors available to the U.S. Military are unable to reach the forces afloat as it would flood and exceed the capabilities of the supporting infrastructure.  While the corporate Navy looks for IT inefficiencies reduce costs the afloat forces require significant resources to bring them into the current generation of technology (again Big Navy and the U.S. Navy have always been technology-centric) in order to move the supporting information-centric element.

Transformation Process- The ponderous acquisition process remains; technology speed of advance has only increased.  I’ve heard more than 50 FO/GO and their equivalent civilian counterparts state this problem over the last 7 years and yet it continues to remain.  We own these rules – the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense.  Call it a Grand Challenge – we’ve seen the model that has worked for USSOCOM; make it the model for everything and move on.  We’ll find the issues with this new model and another, better model one will develop.

I want to ensure I’m not opposing an adversary in the future while worrying about a National Deficit in the $15 trillion realm.  I want this reduced, eliminated and operate at a surplus.

Let’s become the lender; Let’s return to be the global leader!

[via Proceedings]

Solar Flare

Image via NASA

Any Communications expert worth their salt knows that Solar Weather affects how we communicate.  We know that this includes Solar flares, coronal mass ejections, high-speed solar wind, and solar energetic particles.  These are are all forms of solar activity or combined, Solar Weather or Solar Storm.

The most likely effects will take the form of things that are supported by satellite assets.  Most notably in our day to day lives this take the form of Global Positioning System (GPS), China’s BeiDou Navigation System, or Europe’s Galileo system.  When solar flares hit the ionosphere they immediately have detrimental effects upon communications and radio navigation.  These Solar energetic particles take anywhere from 20 minutes to several hours to reach Earth.

The reason this is getting so much attention is that we’re at one of the peaks of the Solar Cycle.  These cycles occur every 9-14 years and 2012 happens to be one of the expected peaks.

What this really means to the average individual is that there may be a slight (extremely slight) noticeable increase in GPS accuracy and time to acquire satellites may take longer.  There may be similar issues with dropped calls.  This is where it becomes hard to determine and differentiate what is really causing the problems the normal individual is experiencing.

Did your dropped call happen because you were shifting cell towers, walked into a dense building, did the other person have the issue and nothing was wrong on your end, the list goes on.  There are so many examples of other issues on Earth to worry about when you are enjoying that new 4G iPad 3 then Solar Flares.

My advice is to sit back and acknowledge that there are simply things that are going to cause problems with your navigation and communications devices.  Make sure you are always aware of how to accomplish what you’d like to do without these items.  Review the map and routes you’re taking before you simply follow every turn by turn direction of your GPS.

”][via NASA]

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